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Emanation 
 
As noticed by Dörrie, “emanation” is a metaphor whose philosophical 
use, although attested in various contexts from the Presocratics to the Stoics, 
becomes prominent only in late Antiquity as a way to describe the causality 
of the First Principle. This metaphor conveys the idea of a production which 
does not imply, as workmanship does, the decision to start a process whose 
output is the thing the craftsman wanted to make. Rather, “emanation” 
suggests that the effect flows spontaneously from the very nature of the 
principle, as light and heat from the sun. Plotinus has recourse to this 
metaphor especially when faced with the riddle of the derivation of the many 
from the One. In the myth of the Cave, Plato alludes to the derivation of the 
manifold Forms from the “Idea of Good” which transcends Being in power 
and dignity. Since for Plotinus in this myth Plato is speaking of the same 
principle which in the Parmenides he defines as the “one”, the problem arises 
of how to account for the derivation of the manifold Forms from a principle 
which is stated to be absolutely simple. Should one refuse to admit that the 
Forms derive from the One, the latter would no longer be the universal 
principle; should one admit that the Forms derive indeed from the One, this 
would prima facie undermine its perfect simplicity. Even though an account 
of Plotinus’ solution of this riddle does not fall within the scope of this 
introduction, it is useful to remark from the outset that the metaphor of 
“emanation” concerns primarily the production of the first instance of 
multiplicity: the intelligible Forms, and the divine Intellect intelligising them. 
The One-Good is conceived of as a principle provided in and by itself with a 
transitive power. As the power that fire has to heat cannot be removed from 
it without infringing its definition, so with the One: the transitive power to 
produce the many belongs to its notion, in so far as the One coincides for 
Plotinus with the Good, which is self-diffusive by definition. Hence, it 
remains unaffected, no matter how many things derive from it: “For think of 
a spring which has no other origin, but gives the whole of itself to rivers, and 
is not used up by the rivers but remains itself at rest, but the rivers that rise 
from it, before each of them flows in a different direction, remain for a while 
all together, though each of them knows, in a way, the direction in which it is 
going to let its stream flow” (III 8[30], 10.5-10, trans. Armstrong). As shown 
by this passage, the metaphor paves the way to the properly pantheistic 
inference that the nature of the principle transfuses itself into the derivatives. 
However, this undesired consequence is explicitly ruled out by Plotinus: “It is 
certainly none of the things of which it is origin” (ibid., 28-29, trans. 
Armstrong). 
This doctrine was transmitted to the Arabic-speaking world via 
Graeco-Arabic translations. In the formative period of Arabic-Islamic 
philosophy, it was combined with the idea of creation and even seen as the 
best way to account for it without giving way to the anthropomorphic 
implications of another metaphor, that of the craftsman. Later on, 
theologians stated the clash between the two doctrines, as exemplified by al-
Ghazālī. 
 
Emanation: the background  
Although the main conduit of the doctrine of emanation was the 
Graeco-Arabic translation of Neoplatonic texts that took place in the 3rd/9th 
century, other translations had already prepared the ground for its 
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understanding as part and parcel of a cosmology based on Aristotle. A 
century before the rise of Islam, at the north-eastern edge of Roman Syria, 
Sergius of Reshʿaynā (d. 536 CE) translated into Syriac, among other works, 
also the pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo and a treatise by Alexander of 
Aphrodisias (lost in Greek) on the principles of the universe. Both texts were 
re-translated into Arabic approximately three centuries later, and both 
combine with the basic Aristotelian picture of the cosmos a new idea, which 
does not exist as such in Aristotle: that of a divine pervasive power that 
reaches the sublunar world through the celestial spheres. In the Arabic 
version of the pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo, which was read aloud at the 
court of the caliph al-Maʾmūn (r. 198-218/813-833), this divine power is 
ascribed to God, and its outcome is labelled “creation, khalq”. The rejection 
of anthropomorphism is made explicit: “Thus, it is a more suitable, also truer 
and more precise, conception of God that his power, which resides in heaven 
and earth, mountains and water, is the cause of the salvation of things and 
their basic principle, although it is so far removed from here. For it is 
unseemly to imagine him as diffused, implanted in everything, inasmuch as it 
would be unseemly and improper that he be compelled to manipulate earthly 
phenomena by hand. The image of such physical labor is repulsive” (104.9-
105.15 Brafman, trans. Brafman, 195). The Arabic version of the pseudo-
Aristotelian De mundo is embedded in a “Letter of the Golden House” 
ascribed to Aristotle in his alleged correspondence with Alexander the Great: 
in the fiction of the text, “Aristotle” sums up and comments upon what the 
Greek wise men Orpheus, Homer, and Heraclitus thought about God and the 
cosmos. Thus the rejection of the anthropomorphic description of creation in 
terms of workmanship was presented as the theological doctrine of Aristotle, 
whose works in the same years were translated for and imitated by al-Kindī 
(d. after 256/870), the philosopher at al-Maʾmūn’s court. 
For al-Kindī Aristotle was “the most distinguished of the Greeks in 
philosophy” (On First Philosophy, 13.11 Rashed-Jolivet, trans. Ivry, 58); 
overcoming the polytheism of his people, he had championed the tawḥīd 
(unicity of God) with his doctrine of the unique Immobile Mover. But once the 
inadequacy of anthropomorphism has been taken for granted, where to find 
a higher model of causality, apt to account for God’s action? Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics and the De caelo were translated in Kindī’s milieu; but in these 
works God’s causality is dealt with only under the form of Aristotle’s mention 
of the first principle as the final cause of celestial motion. The Arabic 
translation of Plotinus and Proclus filled the lacuna. Both the Enneads and 
Proclus’ Elements of theology were translated within the “circle of al-Kindī” 
(Endress, Proclus Arabus; The Circle of al-Kindī), and both versions were 
heavily adapted. In the Arabic versions of Plotinus and Proclus the doctrine of 
the derivation of the many from the transcendent One is systematically 
interpreted as God’s creation (in most cases ibdāʿ, but also khalq). Plotinus’ 
words are amplified, an Aristotelian terminology is added here and there, and 
the One turns out to be God Almighty, the Creator. The rejection of the 
anthropomorphic metaphor of the craftsman is now coupled with the 
Neoplatonic account of a higher mode of causation: “The action of the First 
Agent is not preceded by volition, because he acts solely by the fact of his 
being. (…) He makes and originates things all at one go, being fixed and 
stable in one state, not shifting from state to state. It is thus that the First 
Agent must be, fixed and motionless in essence, without motion of any kind. 
If he is so, he originates all originated things” (Epistle on the Divine Science, 
174.20-175.3 Badawī, Aflūṭīn, taken from Plotinus’ Enn. V 3[49], 12.34-36, 
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trans. Lewis, 321). “Creation” means by now the appearance “all at one go 
(dufʿatan wāḥidatan)” of the derived realities from a transcendent principle 
which remains unaltered. The Aristotelian echo of the Immobile Mover 
resounds through Plotinus’ account of the timeless radiance of the 
intelligible beings from the One; both Aristotle’s and Plotinus’ theories of the 
eternal dependence of an eternal universe upon the first cause count, in this 
reworking, as an explanation of what creation is, and what it is not. “It is 
impossible for us to say that the Creator first reflected over how to originate 
things and then after that originated them. (…) We say that when craftsmen 
wish to fashion a thing they reflect on that thing and copy what they see and 
contemplate within themselves (…) whereas when the Creator wishes to 
make something, he does not envisage patterns within himself. (…) We say 
that there is between him and his creation no intermediate thing on which he 
reflects and the help of which he seeks, but that he originated things by the 
mere fact of his being” (pseudo-Theology of Aristotle, X, 162.11-163.8 
Badawī, Aflūṭīn, taken from Plotinus’ Enn. V 8[31], 7.10-11, trans. Lewis 
393-5). As the source of this quotation shows, Plotinus’ doctrine is endorsed 
by a fictitious “Aristotle”. In fact, most of the Enneads translated into Arabic 
has come down to us under the pseudoepigraphic label of a Theology by 
“Aristotle”, and there is scholarly consensus about the fact that this work was 
put together within the “circle of al-Kindī”. Thus the idea that God created all 
things “by the mere fact of its being” (ps.-Theol. Ar., X, 163.8 Badawī, 
Aflūṭīn), became the doctrine of “Aristotle”. In the Prologue of the Theology, 
the latter declares his wish to add to his Metaphysics a theological pinnacle, 
dealing with God’s causality and its emanation through the descending 
degrees of reality: “Now we have previously completed an explanation of 
them [i.e. the four causes matter, form, efficient cause and final cause] in our 
book which is after the Physics (….). Now our aim in this book is the 
discourse on the Divine Sovereignty, and the explanation of it and how it is 
the first cause, eternity and time being beneath it, and that it is the cause 
and originator of causes, in a certain way, and how the luminous force steals 
from it over mind and, through the medium of mind, over the universal 
celestial soul, and from mind, through the medium of soul, over nature, and 
from soul, through the medium of nature, over the thing that come to be and 
pass away. This action arises from it without motion; the motion of all things 
comes from it and things move towards it by a kind of longing and desire” 
(ps.-Theol. Ar., Prologue, 5.10-6.12 Badawī, Aflūṭīn, trans. Lewis, 486-7). 
The emanation of divine power thus follows the tripartite hierarchy of 
Plotinus’ universe: from the One, it flows over Intellect and the cosmic Soul. 
The finishing touch is the Aristotelian doctrine of the Immobile Mover, whose 
power to impart movement consists in remaining at rest as the final cause of 
the cosmic movement. A hierarchy of levels of reality is established: the First 
Cause transcends not only time, but also eternity, meaning the endless 
circular movement of the outer sphere; above the visible cosmos there are 
the supra-sensible principles Soul and Intellect, which both derive from the 
One, the Creator: “You must dismiss from your imagination all coming into 
existence in time, if you wish to know how the true everlasting noble 
essences were originated from the first originator, for they were brought into 
existence from him without time and with no intermediary between their 
being originated and made, and the originator and maker. How can their 
coming into existence be in time, when they are the cause and the regulation 
and the ordering of time and temporal existences? The cause of time is not 
under time; no, it exists in a higher and loftier manner, like the relation 
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between the shadow and the object casting the shadow” (ps.-Theol. Ar., VIII, 
114.14-17 Badawī, Aflūṭīn, taken from Plotinus’ Enn. V 1[10], 6.19-20, trans. 
Lewis, 275). The same hierarchy, with the suprasensible principles One, 
Intellect and Soul followed by the celestial spheres and the sublunar world of 
coming-to-be and passing away, features in the syllabus taken from Proclus’ 
Elements of theology, the so-called Book by Aristotle on the exposition of 
the pure Good (Liber de causis). A special emphasis is laid in this writing on 
the omnipervasive power which emanates from the First Cause: “Every 
primary cause infuses its effect more powerfully than does a universal 
second cause” (Liber de causis, prop. 1, 3.5 Badawī, al-Aflāṭūniyya, trans. 
Taylor, 5). Since the first cause is the true One and pure Being, its causality 
“by the mere fact of its being” consists in producing being, something it 
alone can do: “All things have essence through the first being (…) This is 
because, if every cause gives something to what it causes, then undoubtedly 
the first being gives being to everything it causes. (…) Now let us repeat and 
say that the first being is at rest and the cause of causes. If it gives being to 
all things, then it gives [it] to them by way of creation” (Liber de causis, prop. 
17, 19.2-12 Badawī, al-Aflāṭūniyya, trans. Taylor, 111). Creation consists in 
giving to derivative realities that property that the principle is to the highest 
degree; hence the labels “pure” or “true”, which convey the Platonic meaning 
of “the property itself”. Since the Neoplatonic One in the Arabic adaptation of 
both Plotinus and Proclus is not only the pure Good (al-khayr al-maḥḍ), as it 
was in the original Neoplatonic texts, but is also transformed into the 
primary Being (al-anniyya al-ūlā), its causality consists in giving being. To do 
so, that unique first cause which is the true One, the pure Good and the 
primary Being has nothing to do if not “remaining” what it is: being flows 
from it by the mere fact of its being. 
The terminology for this notion varies, both in the Arabic Plotinus and 
the Arabic Proclus: bajasa VII and al-inbijās are used for πρόοδος salaka and 
al-sulūk for φθάνειν but also for πρόοδος; sāla is used for ἐκρεῖν and 
ἐγχύειν. The prevailing terminology is that of the overflow: fāḍa and al-fayḍ 
are used for προϊέναι, παράγειν, ἐκφαίνειν, πληροῦν, and ἐπιλάμπειν. 
Through the cosmic hierarchy outlined above, the emanation of divine 
causality reaches the individual substances of the sublunar world: “(…) 
everything that comes to be, falling under time in its substance, has a 
substance that depends on the pure being, which is both the cause of 
durability and the cause of all things, whether sempiternal or destructible” 
(Liber de causis, prop. 31, 32.3-4 Badawī, al-Aflāṭūniyya, trans. Taylor, 161). 
Thus, creation is both the dependence of each and every being from the pure 
Being, and the emanation of a hierarchy of degrees beneath it: Intellect and 
the separate substances, the cosmic soul, and the visible world in which the 
individual souls are dwelling. Some of these realities are also principles, i.e. 
are endowed with a causal power; but they owe it to the first principle and 
operate within its all-embracing causality: “It is, therefore, now clear and 
plain that the first remote cause is more comprehensively and more 
powerfully the cause of a thing than the proximate cause. (…) The first cause 
aids the second cause in its activity, because the first cause also effects every 
activity that the second cause effects, although it effects it in another way 
[which is] higher and more sublime. (…) The effect of the second cause is 
only through the power of the first cause. This is because, when the second 
cause makes a thing, the first cause, which is above it, infuses that thing with 
its power, so that it adheres powerfully to that thing and conserves it”  (Liber 
de causis, prop. 1, 4.4-10 Badawī, al-Aflāṭūniyya, trans. Taylor, 6). This 
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helps understanding why the Muslim philosophers saw no contradiction 
whatsoever between “emanation” and creation out of nothing, provided that 
the latter is interpreted as the total derivation of created things from that 
unique principle which needs neither preconditions nor instruments in order 
to operate. The Liber de causis states the difference between creation and 
every other kind of causation, be it the universal action of the separate 
substances, whose causality does not concern individuals but the whole: no 
matter how powerful they are, the universal secondary causes cannot create. 
While creation needs no preconditions, every other causality operates “by 
way of form” (Liber de causis, prop. 17, 19.11 Badawī, al-Aflāṭūniyya, trans. 
Taylor, 111), having as its precondition being, which is the direct effect of 
the first cause alone. This distinction between the causality “by way of 
creation” and that “by way of form”, presented in a sentence of the Liber de 
causis which has no antecedent in Proclus, paves the way to the 
understanding of the (revised) Neoplatonic emanation as the philosophical 
account for God’s creation.  
 
Emanation: the doctrine in Arabic philosophy and its theological rejection 
In his On first philosophy al-Kindī borrows from Philoponus’ anti-
eternalist polemic, which was known to him through the Arabic translation of 
at least some parts of the De aeternitate mundi, a series of arguments 
against the actual infinity of body, bodily movement, and time. Implying as it 
does his allegiance to the doctrine of creation in time, this seems to prevent 
him from siding with that of emanation. In-depth analysis of this point would 
exceed the limits of this survey. Leaving aside the question of the inner 
consistency that al-Kindī was able to reach, it is worth mentioning that he 
did both reject the possibility of an infinite stretch of time, and espouse the 
doctrine of causality by emanation in the sense outlined above, which in his 
view coincides with creation. He says: “the emanation (fayḍ) of unity from the 
True One, the First, is the coming to be of every sensible object and what is 
attached to the sensible object; and the True One causes every one of them 
to exist when it causes them to be through its being. Therefore the cause of 
coming to be is due to the True One, which does not acquire unity from a 
donor but is rather one through its essence. Moreover, that which is made to 
be is not eternal, and that which is not eternal is created, i.e., it comes to be 
from a cause; consequently that which is made to be is created” (On first 
philosophy, 97.8-12 Rashed-Jolivet, trans. Ivry, 113). 
In his Views of the citizens of the best state, al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) 
endorses the Neoplatonic emanation as the description of the causality of the 
first principle: “The genesis of that which comes into existence from it takes 
place by way of an emanation (ʿalā jihati fayḍin). (…) Again, by giving 
existence to something else the First does not attain a perfection which it did 
not have before (…). Nor is it in need, in order for the existence of something 
else to emanate from its existence, of anything other than its very essence, 
neither of a quality which would be in it nor of a motion through which it 
would acquire a state which it did not have before” (Views of the citizens of 
the best state, 88.15, 90.11, 92. 8-10 Walzer, trans. Walzer, 89, 91, and 93). 
It is in this work that emanation is shaped for the first time in the 
arrangement of the ten celestial spheres established by Ptolemy, from that of 
the Fixed Stars to that of the Moon. According to al-Fārābī, each separate 
substance with its sphere emanates from the principle which is above it 
through an act of intellection: this intellection results in the 
“substantification” (tajawhur) of the related celestial sphere. Thus, emanation 
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implies a knowing act on the part of the emanated reality, which gives rise to 
a second principle after the First: “From the First emanates the existence of 
the Second. This Second is, again, an utterly incorporeal substance, and is 
not in matter. It thinks of (intelligizes) its own essence and thinks the First. 
(…) As a result of its thinking the First, a third existent follows necessarily 
from it; and as a result of its substantification in its specific essence, the 
existence of the First Heaven follows necessarily” (Views of the citizens of the 
best state, 100.11-15 Walzer, trans. Walzer, 101). This pattern is repeated 
along the ten celestial spheres, from the First Heaven to the sphere of the 
Moon. Several philosophical and cosmological traditions lie in the 
background of this doctrine. On the one hand, there are the Greek 
cosmological ideas: Ptolemy’s cosmological system, and a well established 
tradition of thought that had long before stated the animation of the 
heavens, and which is reflected in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise on the 
principles of the universe, whose Arabic translation has been mentioned 
above. On the other hand, there is Neoplatonism. The Farabian “Second” is 
described as a separate Intellect which intelligises the First, an account which 
is clearly reminiscent of Plotinus’ doctrine of the “generation” of the Intellect 
from the One. In the non-temporal procession outlined above, the Intellect 
arises through a cognitive “return” towards the One, which is accomplished 
by the first item that emanates directly from the One, i.e. the indeterminate 
power to give rise to a multiplicity. The relationship of dependence that this 
indeterminate power has towards the One is expressed by the image of its 
turning back towards it, and the rise of the intelligible world is presented by 
Plotinus as the outcome of this process. Plotinus warns the reader against 
understanding this as a real process, while in reality it is the analysis of the 
logical steps driving from the absolute simplicity of the One to the living 
multiplicity of the Intellect and the intelligible forms; but what is important to 
keep in mind here is that in this procession from the One the decisive step is 
an act of intellection accomplished by its first offspring, an intellection that 
has the One itself as its object. This is argued in a number of treatises (esp. 
V 1[10], V 3[49], and V 4[7]) whose Arabic translation was available to al-
Fārābī. However, this is only a part of the story. In the Elements of theology 
(prop. 173) Proclus had maintained that every intellectual substance 
intelligises not only itself, but also what is above it and what is below it. This 
doctrine too was available in Arabic, both in itself and embedded in the Liber 
de causis (prop. 7). In addition, the Liber de causis incorporated also prop. 
177 of the Elements of theology, stating that “Every intelligence is full of 
forms” (Liber de causis, prop. 9, 12.19 Badawī, al-Aflāṭūniyya, trans. Taylor, 
74). The Farabian theory of cosmic emanation results from the intermingling 
of all these different patterns, which combine with one another in a relatively 
new picture if compared with Neoplatonism, both in itself and in its 
adaptations of Kindī’s times. Parting company with the Arabic Neoplatonic 
texts which play such an important role in his metaphyiscs and cosmology, 
al-Fārābi grants the first principle a feature, inspired by Aristotle, that the 
Neoplatonic One does not possess: intellectual activity. This feature deserves 
attention because it is potentially conflicting with the spontaneous radiance 
of the derivatives implied in the doctrine of emanation. Although al-Fārābī 
does not address this question, the move to define the First as “actual 
Intellect, ʿaql bi-l-fiʿl” (Views of the citizens of the best state, 70.2 Walzer, 
trans. Walzer, 71) elicits the twin issue of the free will of the First in 
emanation, and of its knowledge of derivatives. In granting intellection to the 
First, and more in general in the main picture of “emanation”, the Farabian 
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assessment is a turning point in Arabic philosophy. Al-Fārābī created out of 
a variety of sources a new frame, destined to be developed (by the falāsifa) or 
rejected (by the theologians). In the Farabian version of emanatism, the idea 
ultimately based on Aristotelian cosmology that the celestial spheres consist 
of immaterial realities moved each by an intellect is combined with the 
Plotinian account of the non-temporal “generation” of the Intellect from the 
One. But the doctrine that the first derivative reality arises from an act of 
intellection does no longer account, as it was in Plotinus, only for the rise of 
Intellect from the One: for al-Fārābī, who follows in the footsteps of the 
Arabic Proclus and the Liber de causis, this a-temporal process of 
“generation” through intellection is repeated as many times as there are 
separate intellectual substances. Once moulded into the shape of Aristotle’s 
and Ptolemy’s universe, the Neoplatonic theory is transformed into the topic 
that after the First there are ten separate substances of diminishing power, 
whose last item produces the sublunar world. The lowest intellectual 
substance is the same principle which in the treatise On the Intellect al-
Fārābī identifies with the Agent Intellect of the Peripatetic tradition. However, 
at variance with Alexander of Aphrodisias who had identified the Agent 
Intellect with the Immobile Mover, al-Fārābī keeps them carefully distinct 
from one another. Full of intelligibile forms as every separate intellectual 
substance (Liber de causis), the Agent Intellect operates both on the sublunar 
matter, providing it with the forms of natural things, and on the human 
potential intellect, allowing the latter to participate in the intelligibles that it 
contains in itself. 
The Farabian synthesis of Aristotelian-Peripatetic metaphysics and 
Ptolemaic cosmology, combined within the main frame of the Neoplatonic 
emanation reworked in the pseudo-Theology of Aristotle and in the Liber de 
causis, was inherited by Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037). In the metaphysical part of 
the Book of the Cure, the latter sides with creation out of nothing (ibdāʿ). The 
whole (al-kull) in relationship with the first cause is said to be a creature, 
mubdaʿ; absolute creation (al-ibdāʿ al-muṭlāq) equals absolute 
existentialisation (al-taʾyīs al-muṭlāq). In doing this, the One is indeed the 
creator of everything (muḥdith), but Ibn Sīnā carefully removes any 
temporality from this relationship of dependence of the created universe 
from its muḥdith (Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 3, 342.15-343.6 Mūsā et al.)  
There is only one principle which has the power for such an 
existentialisation: the First, the necessary existent (wājib al-wujūd, necesse 
esse), which does not possess a quiddity (māhiyya) as distinct from the pure 
Being, called anniyya as in the foundational texts of the Arabic Neoplatonic 
tradition (Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 4, 344.10 Mūsā et al.). This principle, 
as was the case with al-Fārābī, is the true One (Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 
4, 343.10-15 Mūsā et al.). Once again, the problem arises of how to account 
for the production of the many from a principle which is perfectly simple by 
definition; once again, the solution begins by ruling out the possibility for it 
to undergo a change, as would be the decision to create: such an innovation 
in the will (ḥudūth al-irāda) would contradict the very definition of the 
necesse esse (Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 1, 376.10-17 Mūsā et al.). Ibn Sīnā 
has recourse to the Neoplatonic model outined above: the power that the 
principle has to produce its derivatives is included in the definition itself: put 
otherwise, the good “overflows” from it (Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 4, 
402.16-403.1 Mūsā et al.). Like in the Arabic Plotinus and in al-Fārābī, 
emanation (fayḍ) takes the form of the origination of a primary, most 
excellent intellectual substance (Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 4, 404.4-8 Mūsā 
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et al.). The axiom that from what is absolutely one, in so far as it is one, only 
one thing can proceed (Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 4, 405.13-14 Mūsā et al.) 
makes explicit the rule of Fārābī’s universe: the more a degree is near the 
One, the more it is simple and perfect. Conversely, the more a principle is 
removed from it, the less it is powerful. Hence, the last of the separate 
intellectual substances is, in purely Farabian vein, the “donor of the forms” 
both to the sublunar world and to our minds. This principle subdivides into a 
multiplicity what in the higher intellectual substances is more unitary and 
simple. In setting the scene of the hierarchy of the degrees after the First, 
and in granting to the lowest intellectual substance the causality with respect 
to the sublunar world and the human mind, Ibn Sīnā follows in al-Fārābī’s 
footsteps. But he addresses two questions which remained implicit in al-
Fārābī: that of the free will of the One in giving rise to its derivatives, and 
that of the knowledge it has of them. Both questions arise from the Farabian 
move to add to the Neoplatonic One the Aristotelian feature of being an 
Intellect: Ibn Sīnā frames much of his discussion of the two issues against the 
backdrop of a Neoplatonic emanation whose starting point is no longer a 
principle located beyond Being and Intellect, as it was in Plotinus and Proclus: 
Ibn Sīnā’s first cause is at one and the same time the One, God Almighty, and 
the divine Mind of Book XII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Hence the effort Ibn 
Sīnā makes to disentangle fayḍ from necessitarism, and God’s transcendence 
from unawareness of its offsprings and their deeds. “The coming to be of the 
whole from Him is not by way of nature in that the existence of the whole 
comes to be from Him with neither knowledge nor satisfaction on His part. 
How can this be true when He is a pure intellect that intellectually 
apprehends Himself? Hence, He must intellectually apprehend that the 
existence of the whole is a necessary consequence of Himself, because He 
apprehends Himself only intellectually, as a pure intellect and a first 
principle. He only intellectually apprehends the existence of the whole 
[proceeding] from Him in being its principle. There is in His essence neither 
an impediment for nor an aversion to the proceeding of the whole from Him. 
(…) Hence, the First is satisfied with the emanation of the whole from Him.” 
(Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 4,402.14-403.3 Mūsā et al., trans. Marmura, 
327). Accordingly, the knowledge that the First has of the individuals of the 
sublunar world is that of their intelligible features. Nothing individual 
escapes it (fa-lā yaʿzibu ʿanhu shayʾun shakhṣiyyun), this is Ibn Sīnā’s 
conviction; however, in the explanation of how this is possible he argues that 
the First knows individuals in so far as they can be the object of intellection, 
i.e. insofar as they are universal, min haythu hiya kulliyyatun (Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. 
Ilāhiyyāt, VIII, 6, 359.12-360.3 Mūsā et al.). 
Neither explanation did sound convincing to al-Ghazālī, who listed 
eternalism and Ibn Sīnā’s account of God’s knowledge of individuals as two 
of the three examples of the philosophers’ outspoken unbelief: “If someone 
asks ‘now that you have discussed in detail the teaching of these 
[philosophers], do you [also] say decisively that they hold unbelief (kufr) and 
that the killing of someone who upholds their convictions is obligatory?’ We 
answer: pronouncing them unbelievers must be done in three questions. One 
of them is the question of the world’s pre-eternity and their saying that the 
substances are pre-eternal. The second is their statement that God’s 
knowledge does not encompass the temporally created particulars among 
individual [existents]. (…) Such a position is manifest unbelief, which none of 
the various groups of Muslim [ever] held” (Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 376.2-10 
Bouyges, trans. Marmura, 226). In the theological discourse, a different 
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account of God’s causality was deemed necessary for believers, an account 
which implied the rejection of the philosophical doctrine of emanation. Those 
believers seeking for the support of Kalām (speculative theology) were urged 
to replace it with the assessment of the unconditioned free will of God as the 
only rationale behind creation. There is no scholarly consensus on Ghazālī’s 
own cosmological convictions, i.e. whether or not he held an unambiguous 
occasionalist position, but his rejection of al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s 
emanationist metaphysics is widely accepted in scholarship. After the clash 
between the theological and philosophical accounts of God’s creation, 
emanationism survived in a variety of forms. To the extent in which it was 
embedded in a number of writings on occult sciences whose most imposing 
example is the encyclopaedia of the Brethren of Purity, and was combined 
with Gnostic accounts of various kinds, the doctrine of emanation fuelled the 
pantheistic background of Islamic mysticism best exemplified by Ibn ʿArabī 
(d. 638/1240). In the Muslim West, the doctrine of emanation was known 
through the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, which had some circulation in 
al-Andalus, and mostly through the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Within 
the main frame of the Aristotelian universe endorsed by Ibn Rushd (d. 
595/1198), the Farabian and Avicennian hierarchy of the degrees of supra-
sensible reality after the First survived only in the residual form of the Agent 
Intellect as a separate substance, distinct from and subordinated to the First 
Principle. There is a scholarly debate about a possible evolution of Ibn Rushd 
from an initial allegiance to the emanationist model to a rejection of it by the 
time he completed the Tahāfut al-tahāfut, but emanation is rejected in the 
Long commentary on the Metaphysics, admittedly a late work. Replaced in 
Ibn Rushd’s thought by a cosmology which was intended to counter Ghazālī’s 
attack on Ibn Sīnā by being as faithful as possible to Aristotle, emanationism 
was kept alive in the East of the Muslim world, within the context of post-
Avicennian thought. But the doctrine outlined above was also deeply 
transformed: in the illuminationist school which took issue with Suhrawardī 
(d. 632/1234), and more in general In the philosophical tradition of 
Ismāʿīlism, emanation provided the metaphysical background to mysticism 
on the one hand, and to the eschatological expectation of the final 
theophany, on the other. 
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